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Abstract 
This paper presents the dimensions of the climate change problem and its economic 
effects as well as the evolution of the international meetings to cope with it. In these 
lines it discusses the use of Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs), the damage cost 
estimates and various other issues related to global warming and concerning the 
significance of uncertainty and risk aversion, the importance of discounting and the 
impact of financial crisis on emissions predictions. The methods of constructing 
abatement cost curves together with adaptation policies are presented. It also refers to 
the basic policy approaches for reducing greenhouse gases paying attention to 
emissions trading schemes.  
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1. The problem of climate change and its dimensions 
  Greenhouse gases (hereafter GHGs) include emissions of carbon dioxide 
(CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxides (N2O) and a number of high global warming 
potential (GWP)1 gases like hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs),  perfluorocarbons (PFCs) 
and sulfur hexafluoride (SF6) known as F-gases trapping heat near the surface of the 
earth and leading to global warming.2 Due to these various GHGs global warming is 
considered as one of the most serious environmental problems caused by human 
activities and affecting significantly the climate.  
  The effects of climate change are serious and several. Coastal flooding from 
the rise in the sea level, intensive storms and floods and extreme weather conditions, 
reduced productivity of natural resources like scarce water reservoirs and lower and 
poorer agricultural production are some of them. Climate change is associated not 
only to the problem imposed to the environment but also to various physical, social 
and economic consequences like productivity reductions, population migration and 
changed climate conditions. 
  The socio-economic effects of global warming depend on changes in sea level, 
precipitation, ocean currents, spread of diseases and various other elements difficult to 
count and predict. As location of sources of GHG emissions is unrelated to the 
location of the environmental effects in terms of damages and degradation, they are 
considered as uniformly mixing pollutants3 with their concentration levels to be 
invariant from place to place. At the same time all emitter countries are influenced by 
the emissions of the others implying a reciprocal spillover problem from a global 
public “bad” (Perman et al., 2003). Climate change may be considered as an open 
                                                 
1 The importance of GWP is explained analytically in Section 3. 
2 All these GHGs are regulated by the Kyoto Protocol. Although the effect of water vapor is also 
significant it is not listed among the GHGs. 
3 Uniformly mixing pollutants occur when physical processes operate in such a way as to disperse them 
to the point in which their spatial distribution is uniform (Perman et al. 2003, p. 178).  
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access resource problem depending more on the world economy compared to 
economic activities in individual countries. This implies that actions to cope with the 
problem demand global cooperation (Stern et al., 2013; Arrow, 2007).4  
In these lines, climate change is a global externality leading to market failure 
as the sources of pollution do not bear the full cost of their actions and the resulting 
external (social) costs imposed to others are not in the majority of the cases taken into 
consideration. With no policy interventions, polluters have no (or little) motivation to 
take into consideration the social costs imposed to others in their decision-making. At 
the same time, economists calculate that doubling of CO2 concentrations may result to 
damages equal to around 1%-2% of total output (Wayne, 2008). These are 
accompanied by the associated GHG emissions’ irreversibility, their very long 
residence time in the atmosphere and the inability of individual countries to 
internalize the negative external costs (Arrow, 2007) as well as the existence of 
various synergistic effects. 
The main attention of scientific research has been concentrated on CO2 
emissions with a number of studies using a single pollutant case (Hourcade and 
Shukla, 2001; Morita et al., 2001). Recently, Granados et al. (2012) examined the 
short-run determinants of atmospheric CO2, while Wang et al. (2013) examined the 
carbon emissions trends in terms of optimal balanced economic growth in the case of 
China and USA, discussing a number of abatement options for China. Similarly, Du et 
al. (2012) examined the relationship of CO2 emissions and economic development in 
China, and Ibrahim and Law (2014) examined the relationship between social capital 
and CO2 emissions.
5  
                                                 
4 Arrow (2007) refers to the USA’s contribution (almost 25%) to world CO2 emissions emphasizing 
that its own policy to cope with the problem may be influential making a significant difference. 
5 Many researchers have tested the validity of the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) hypothesis 
which corresponds to an inverted U-shaped relationship between environmental damage or pollutants 
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The lack of extensive cross-sectional data has led to few studies examining 
non-CO2 gases (Chesnaye et al., 2001). At the same time, a limitation of earlier 
studies may be pointed out on the use of exogenous control cost functions instead of 
considering non-CO2 gases in analytic models (Hyman et al., 2002). The 
consideration of both CO2 and non-CO2 control options may have important benefits 
on the so-called multi-pollutant abatement strategies. Some of these benefits are the 
higher elasticity in mitigation options (Lucas et al., 2005; Manne and Richels, 2001; 
van Vuuren et al., 2003; Hyman et al., 2002) and the substantial cost reductions 
compared to strategies coping only with CO2 due to possible existence of cheaper 
control options for some non-CO2 GHGs (Harmelink et al., 2005; Blok et al., 2001). 
Van Vuuren et al. (2006) and Weyant and de la Chesnaye (2006) cite that across 
models and on average, a multi-pollutant strategy may achieve a costs reduction of 
30-60% in comparison to only CO2 emissions abatement.  
The structure of the paper is the following. Section 2 presents the evolution of 
the various international meetings to cope with the global warming problem. Section 
3 discusses the damage cost estimates and the various uncertainties associated with 
the problem. Apart from presenting information on the damage costs this section 
refers to the various existing integrated assessment models as well as to the ways of 
considering the evolution of emissions. Section 4 presents the methods applied in 
estimating abatement cost functions. Section 5 discusses the basic policy approaches 
to control GHG emissions paying attention to emissions trading schemes. Section 6 
refers to the policy of adaptation while the last section concludes the paper.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
emissions (in our case CO2) and economic growth (GDP per capita). Halkos (2012) provides a review 
of a number of studies exploring this issue.  
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2.  Evolution of various meetings in terms of global climate policy   
The mitigation of harmful emissions is the aim of worldwide legislative 
frameworks like the European Union, the UK Climate Change Act and the Kyoto 
Protocol with the aim of reducing GHGs emissions by 5% below 1990 levels during 
the first commitment time period of 2008-2012. The established in 1988 Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) by the World Meteorological 
Organization (WMO) considered technical and socioeconomic research in the climate 
change area. International efforts to cope with climate change started by the “Earth 
Summit” in 1992 at Rio de Janeiro leading to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (hereafter UNFCCC) that was established in 1994 for 
the stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere and the 
cooperation in tackling climate change by limiting average global temperature.  
  Table 1 presents the evolution and the results of the various meetings from 
1979 to 2015 in terms of global climate policies.6 A number of states commitments 
have taken place for additional protection in the 19 Conferences Of the Parties so far 
(COPs) in one of which (COP3) in 1997 the Kyoto Conference took place with the 
states to agree for the reduction of the six GHGs (CO2, CH4, N2O, HFCs, PFCs, SF6) 
and leading to the Kyoto Protocol. This Protocol committed industrial states to 
decrease total GHG emissions in the first commitment period (2008 to 2012) by at 
least 5% lower levels of their 1990 levels.  
The COP serves as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP) 
where all the Kyoto Protocol Parties States are represented in the CMP, while no 
Parties States may just participate as observers.7 The CMP reviews the running of the 
                                                 
6 The chronology and details of the major negotiations on climate change policies are presented also in 
McKibbun and Wilcoxen (2005) and Kolstad and Toman (2005).  
7 For more information on the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the 
Kyoto Protocol see http://unfccc.int/bodies/body/6397.php 
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Kyoto Protocol and decides on the way to implement it effectively. It meets annually 
during the same period as the COPs. The first CMP took place in Montreal (Canada) 
in December 2005 together with COP-11.  
COP 19 took place in Warsaw and announced the dates and locations of COP 
20/CPM 10 taking place within 1-12 December 2014 in Peru (Lima) and COP 
21/CPM 11 within 30 November–11 December 2015 in France (Paris). It ended up 
with a number of decisions advancing Warsaw’s Framework for REDD+ and 
International Mechanism for Loss and Damage, Durban’s Platform and the Green 
Climate Fund and Long-Term Finance, REDD+ finance, institutional arrangements 
and other methodological issues.8  
2.1  The Kyoto Ptotocol and its mechanisms 
As mentioned already, in 1997 the Kyoto Protocol came in action stating that 
“Annex B” (industrialized “Annex I” in the convention) countries should reduce 
GHGs with the first period of commitment within 2008-2012 and the second period 
within 2013-2020. Industrial nations agreed to limit emissions of GHGs to 5.2% 
below 1990 levels. This would be 30% below the levels projected for 2010. The 
Kyoto Treaty officially took effect when Russia ratified it in November 2004. No 
requirements imposed on newly industrialized countries (e.g. China). In USA the 
Bush administration and many in Congress were opposed to the treaty. The USA 
would have been required to cut emissions to 7% below 1990 levels by the years 2008 
through 2012. Now we have 195 participating countries in the Convention and 192 in 
the Kyoto Protocol.9  
                                                 
8 For more information see http://unfccc.int/  
9 List of Annex I Parties to the Convention (Source: http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/parties/ 
annex_i/items/2774.php)  [With ** parties for which there is a specific COP and/or CMP decision]. 
Austria, Belarus**, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia**, Cyprus, Czech Republic**, Denmark, Estonia, 
European Union, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy**, Japan, Latvia, 
Liechtenstein**,  Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco**, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, 
 7 
The treaty’s countries listed in Annex I are industrialized countries while non-
Annex I countries are developing countries. Countries listed in Annex B are a subset 
of industrial countries of Annex I in the original UNFCCC. Belarus had not ratified 
the UNFCCC till COP3 and is excluded from Annex B, as well as Turkey. Kyoto 
Protocol limits emissions of Annex I of UNFCCC to the levels provided in the Annex 
B of the Protocol (McKibbin and Wilcoxen, 2005).  
In the framework of the Kyoto Protocol, three mechanisms may be used by 
Annex I Parties to achieve emission targets at the lowest costs: the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM); the Joint Implementation (JI); and the International 
Emissions Trading (IET). 
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) helps countries included in 
Annex I to achieve compliance with their GHG emission caps by permitting Annex I 
countries to satisfy part of their Kyoto Protocol emission control targets acquiring 
Certified Emission Reduction units from CDM emission control actions in developing 
countries to be traded in emission trading schemes. It also assists members not 
                                                                                                                                            
Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation**, Slovakia**, Slovenia**, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey,  
Ukraine**, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.   
List of Non-Annex I (Source:  http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/parties/non_annex_i/items/ 283 
3.php) [With * observer states; with ** parties for which there is a specific COP and/or CMP decision] 
Afghanistan, Albania**, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia**, 
Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cabo Verde, 
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Cook Islands, Costa 
Rica, Cuba, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, 
Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Israel, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan**, Kenya, 
Kiribati, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, 
Micronesia (Federated States of), Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, 
Nauru, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Niue, Oman, Pakistan, Palau, Palestine*, Panama, Papua New 
Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova**, Rwanda, Saint Kitts 
and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, 
Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South 
Africa, South Sudan*, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, 
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, 
Turkmenistan**, Tuvalu, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, 
Uzbekistan**, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.    
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included in Annex I to achieve sustainability and to contribute to their target of 
UNFCCC. 
Table 1: Summary of climate change policy actions*  
1979 1st World Climate Conference (WCC) in Geneva (Switzerland). 
1988 The setup of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
1990 1st IPCC’s assessment report (significant uncertainty for the first evidence that human activities might be 
affecting climate). 2nd WCC in Geneva (agreement for the negotiation of a global framework treaty). 
1991 1st Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) meeting. 
1992 The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is established as an 
international treaty at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro (Brazil); “Annex I” developed countries 
undertake to have their emission levels in 2000 as these of 1990; UNFCCC  opens for signature together 
with UNCBD and UNCCD Rio’s Conventions. 
1994 UNFCCC comes into force. 
1995 2nd IPCC’s assessment report (with more confidence that human activities may be negatively affecting 
climate). 1st Conference of the Parties (COP-1) in Berlin (Germany) (negotiation of the legally binding 
targets and timetables for reduction of Annex I countries’ emissions).   
1996 COP-2 in Geneva (Switzerland) rejected the proposal of the imposition of uniform policies allowing 
Annex I countries to develop their own policies. 
1997 Kyoto Protocol is officially adopted in December at COP-3 in Kyoto (Japan); Annex I/Annex B 
countries agree to limit emission reduction to around 5% below 1990 levels by the first commitment 
period 2008-2012, with various flexibility mechanisms available for compliance; no commitments for 
emission reductions by developing countries. 
1998 COP-4 in Buenos Aires (Argentina) calls attention to make operational the Kyoto Protocol’s flexibility 
mechanisms. 3rd IPCC’s assessment report. 
1999 COP-5 in Bonn (Germany) monitored the progress on the work program proposed in COP-4 and 
continued the call for attention to make the flexibility mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol operational.  
2000 COP-6 in Hague (the Netherlands) and deadlock on the implementation of key conditions of Kyoto 
Protocol. 
2001 COP-6-2 in Bonn (Germany) in July continued COP-6. George Bush (U.S.A. President) stated in March 
opposition to Kyoto Protocol. IPCC’s 3rd Assessment Report is published. COP-7 in Marrakesh 
(Morocco) adopted the majority of the recommendations of COP-6 and finalized in details the rules for 
implementing Kyoto Protocol’s flexibility mechanisms (mainly the Clean Development Mechanism) and 
it set-up new funding mechanisms for adaption and technology transfer.  
2002 COP-8 in New Delhi (India) called developed countries to transfer technology and minimize effect of 
climate change on developing countries.  
2003 At COP-9 in Milan (Italy) parties agreed to the Adaptation Fund as proposed at COP-7 to support 
developing countries to adapt more to climate change. 
2004 COP-10 in Buenos Aires (Argentina) discussed the progress since COP-1.  
2005 Kyoto Protocol comes into force. In COP-11 in Montreal (Canada) we have the 1st Meeting of the Parties 
to Kyoto Protocol (CMP 1); discussions on next stage of Kyoto Protocol under the Ad-Hoc Working 
Group on additional commitments for Annex I parties (AWG-KP).   
2006 At COP-12 (CMP 2) in Nairobi (Kenya) parties adopted a 5-year plan to support adaptation by 
developing countries and agreed on procedures for the Adaptation Fund.  
2007 
 
4th IPCC’s assessment report. On the Bali (Indonesia) Road Map Parties at COP-13 (CMP 3) agreed on a 
post-2012 outcome in two work streams: AWG-KP and Ad-Hoc outcome in two work issues: the AWG-
KP and the Ad-Hoc Working Group on Long Term Cooperative Action Under the Convention.   
2008 COP-14 (CMP 4) in Poznan (Poland) in December advanced the Bali Action Plan and discussed the 
development and transfer of technologies and reviewed financial mechanisms of the Convention. 
2009 Copenhagen (Denmark) Accord was discussed at COP-15 (CPM 5) with countries submitting later their 
emission control or mitigation plans. 
2010 Cancun (Mexico) Agreements discussed and mainly accepted by COP-16 (CMP 6). 
2011 Durban (South Africa) Platform for Enhanced Action was discussed and accepted by COP-17 (CMP 7). 
2012 Doha (Qatar) Amendment to Kyoto Protocol adopted by COP-18 (CMP 8). 
2013 COP-19 (CMP 9) in Warsaw (Poland) concluded with a set of decisions advancing more among others 
Warsaw’s Framework for REDD+ and International Mechanism for Loss and Damage, Durban’s 
Platform and the Green Climate Fund and Long-Term Finance. 
2014 COP-20 (CPM 10) will take place in December 2014 at Lima (Peru) 
2015 COP 21 (CPM 11) will take place at the end of 2015 at Paris (France).  
* For details see UNFCCC Secretariat (https://unfccc.int/essential_background/items/6031.php). 
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Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) are a kind of carbon credits or 
emissions units issued by CDM Executive Board for emissions control performed and 
verified by an operational entity according to the Kyoto Protocol rules. These CERs 
may be used by Annex I countries to meet their emission targets or by unit operators 
under the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme to meet the terms of their 
obligations to give up EU allowances and certified emission reductions for carbon 
dioxide emissions of their units.  
Joint implementation (JI) allows Annex I countries to satisfy part of their 
targeted emissions by investing in efforts resulting to emissions control credits in 
other Annex I countries. The traded units are the emission reduction units. In this 
way, countries with binding GHG emissions targets (Annex I countries) are helped to 
meet their requirements. Any Annex I country is able to invest in a joint 
implementation effort in any other Annex I country as an alternative emission control 
plan to reduce emissions at home. Thus countries may reduce the costs of meeting 
their targets under the Kyoto Protocol by investing in efforts that lower GHG 
emissions in an Annex I country where abating pollutants may be cheaper and in this 
way to use the resulting emission reduction units for the achievement of their 
committed target. 
The Kyoto Protocol includes “assigned annual amounts” which may be 
acquired or transferred. Commitment of the Kyoto Protocol is that every country has 
to limit GHG emissions to some percentage of 1990 emissions on an average annual 
basis over a five-year. As mentioned the first commitment period was within 2008-
2012. Two or more Annex I countries are allowed to form a “bubble” offering them 
the opportunity to reallocate permits among themselves. Additionally, the Protocol 
promotes the joint implementation between countries where a country or a company 
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of a country finances emissions control efforts in another country. The Protocol 
allows for CDM by which emissions trading can be conducted with non-Annex I 
countries.  
International Emissions Trading (IET) allows Annex I countries to meet 
part of their targeted emissions by using emissions trading. The total cap of emissions 
for Annex I countries is determined by the counties with each one agreeing to an 
individual target. Assigned Amount Units are the traded units each one equal to one 
ton of CO2e. 
An issue with the Kyoto Protocol agreement is to make developing countries 
tackle the problem under the constraint of lower income levels and maybe their less 
polluting activities compared to the developed countries. A possible solution to this 
issue may be the imposition of a global emissions tax that will internalize the external 
cost imposed to the global society. What is important is to assess the social cost of the 
GHG emissions and each country to pay the corresponding tax. This tax may be low 
or even negative for some countries with Stiglitz (2006) mentioning that this cost is 
the difference in the deadweight loss of the tax on emissions and the tax it substitutes.  
Barrett (2007) mentions three deficiencies of the Kyoto Protocol. Namely, it 
deals only with the control of GHG emissions and fails to modify the incentives 
causing the social costs; it provides only a short-run way of tackling a very long-run 
problem; and it does not paying attention or even ignoring developing countries.  
Halkos and Tzeremes (2014) in order to capture the influence of countries 
compliance with Kyoto Protocol Agreement (KPA), conditioned the years a country 
has signed the agreement until 2007. Their results show that for the first six years 
after countries signed the Kyoto protocol agreement there is a positive effect on their 
environmental efficiencies while after that time period it seems that countries avoid to 
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comply with the actions imposed by the agreement. This is shown in Figure 1 where it 
can be seen that countries adopt the agreement for a certain time period (six years) 
trying to improve environmental performances by reducing CO2 emissions. But after 
that, countries are not complying with the Kyoto Protocol and their higher economic 
growth rates are not associated with the relative reductions on CO2 emissions 
implying a negative effect on their environmental efficiencies. 
Figure 1: Global effect of Kyoto Protocol on countries’ CO2 environmental efficiency 
   
Source: Halkos and Tzeremes (2011) 
 
 
3.  GHG emissions, damage costs estimates and uncertainties  
Carbon dioxide emissions are one of the most significant anthropogenic 
effects released into the atmosphere from, among others, the change in human land 
use and the fossil fuels combustion. But non-CO2 gases are also significant. Methane 
(CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O) are present in the atmosphere naturally. The emissions 
of CH4 stem from production and transport of coal, natural gas and oil together with 
the decomposition of organic wastes while N2O emissions come from agricultural and 
industrial activities and from combustion of fossil fuels and solid wastes.  
 12 
By clearing and cultivating forests, portion of the carbon stored in the woody 
matter of trees is released directly due to burning while other carbon is emitted more 
slowly due to decay. In the last two centuries almost 20-25% of the rise in CO2 
concentrations is due to changes in land use like forests’ clearing and soil cultivation 
for agriculture. CO2 sinks are the oceans (e.g. phytoplankton, coral reefs, various sea 
plants and animals) and land – sequestration in soil, trees etc. Use of fossil fuels are 
the source of more than 80% of GHG emissions while more than 10%, and about 12% 
are due to deforestation and various other changes in the use of land (Hackett, 2011). 
Each GHG has different ability to absorb heat in the atmosphere.  HFCs and 
PFCs are the most heat-absorbent while N2O absorbs 270 times more heat per 
molecule compared to CO2 and CH4 traps 21 times more heat per molecule than CO2 
(Hackett, 2011). Carbon dioxide concentrations have risen more than 25% since the 
Industrial Revolution and they are steadily increasing (almost 0.5% yearly) (Hackett, 
2011). Simultaneously, concentrations of nitrous oxides and methane are rising too. F-
gases are expected to increase rapidly due to quick expansion of various emitting 
industries (semiconductor manufacture and magnesium production) and the 
substitution of ozone depletion substances (ODSs) like CFCs and HCFCs with HFCs 
in some applications (aerosols, air-conditioning, foams etc) under the Montreal 
Protocol. 
F-Gases are generated (not naturally) in various industrial processes after the 
substitution of the Ozone Depleting Substances (ODS, chlorofluorocarbons CFCs and 
hydrochlorofluorocarbons HCFCs) that were faced out under the Montreal Protocol. 
They are also emitted from a number of industrial sources such as use of PFCs in 
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aluminium smelting or in semiconductor manufacture or use of SF6 as insulating gas 
in various electrical systems (Halkos, 2010).10  
3.1  Global Warming Potential  
Global Warming Potential (GWP) is an index that measures different GHGs 
emissions with different atmospheric lifetimes and different radiative properties. 
Maintaining the climate impact constant, GWP measures allow for comparison and 
substitution among different gases to accomplish the desirable target (Fuglestvelt et 
al., 2003). CO2 has a GWP equal to 1 for reasons of comparison. CH4 and N2O have 
GWPs equal to 25 and 298 respectively. Atmospheric lifetimes of PFCs and SF6 are 
very long ranging, as can be seen from Table 2, from 3,200 years for SF6 to 50,000 
years for perfluoromethane (CF4). Usually GHGs emissions estimates are expressed 
in millions of metric tons of CO2 equivalents (mmt of CO2e), weighting each pollutant 
by the value of its GWP.  
Specifically, N2O lasts longer in the atmosphere (approximately 114 years) 
and is stronger in trapping heat (about 298 times more compared to CO2). As nitrous 
oxide has a GWP equal to 298 this implies that it has 298 times more radiative forcing 
compared to CO2 in terms of kgs. CO2e describes different GHGs in a common unit 
showing the amount of CO2 that will result to equivalent global warming effect. 
GHGs quantities are expressed as CO2e by multiplying the GHG amount by its GWP. 
For instance 1 kg of N2O emissions may be expressed as 298 (GWP for 100-years) kg 
of CO2e. 
At the same time, GHGs have to be treated carefully as they have a long run 
(LR) character in terms of their effects and at the same time they are accumulating in 
                                                 
10 Fluorinated gases (CFC, PCFC, HFC, PFC, SF6) comprised around 25% of anthropogenic radiative 
forcing of climate in 1980 and 1990 (IPCC, 1990). This percentage may be attributed to anthropogenic 
gases CFCs and PCFCs, which were regulated due to their depleting influence on stratospheric ozone 
by the Montreal Protocol, but were not included in the Kyoto Protocol (Halkos, 2010).  
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the atmosphere over the entire world. Scientific predictions indicate that if the current 
trends continue then the mean temperatures may increase by 2-6o Fahrenheit in the 
century.  
Table 2: Lifetimes and Global Warming Potentials (GWPs) relative to CO2  
  GWP for different time horizon 
 Lifetime (years) 20-years 100-years 500-years 
Carbon dioxide   (CO2)  1 1 1 
Methane (CH4) 12 72 25 7.6 
Nitrous oxide   (N2O) 114 289 298 153 
Trichlorofluoromethane (CFC-11) 45 6,730 4,750 1,620 
Chlorotrifluoromethane (CFC-13) 640 10,800 14,400 16,400 
Dichlorotetrafluoroethane (CFC-114) 300 8,040 10,000 8,730 
Hydrofluorocarbon (HFC-23) 270 12,000 14,800 12,200 
Hydrofluorocarbon (HFC-32) 4.9 2,330 675 205 
Hydrofluorocarbon (HFC-125) 29 6,350 3,500 1,100 
Fluorocarbon 134a (HFC-134a) 14 3,830 1,430 435 
Sulphur hexafluoride   (SF6) 3,200 16,300 22,800 32,600 
Nitrogen trifluoride   (NF3) 740 12,300 17,200 20,700 
Tetrafluoromethane (CF4) 50,000 5,210 7,390 11,200 
Source: http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg1/en/ch2s2-10-2.html 
 
3.2  Integrated Assessment Models  
 Integrated Assessment Models (hereafter IAMs) can help policy and decision 
makers. IAMs aim at evaluating climate change control policies, assessing and 
quantifying how crucial is the climate change and trying to report various dimensions 
of the climate change problem in a common framework (Kolstad, 1998). Furthermore, 
as defined by Kolstad (1998) an IAM includes not only human activities but also 
aspects of physical relationships forcing climate change. IAMs combine world 
economic activity and the environment providing useful information on policy 
choices.  
According to Parson (1995) an integrated assessment model seeks to provide 
information for use by relevant decision-makers rather than advanced understanding. 
Additionally, a substantial characteristic is that an IAM is capable to combine 
different areas, methods, styles of study or degrees of confidence than would typically 
characterize a study of the same issue. Similarly and according to Weyant et al. 
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(1996) an IAM is a mathematical tool where the knowledge from different fields is 
combined for the purpose of dealing with the issue of climate change.  
  An integrated model includes many definitions and interpretations but these 
interpretations have elements in common such as the cooperation of different 
disciplines and fields and the participation of stakeholders (Rotmans, 1998). The first 
generation of these models focusing on environmental issues emerged in the late 
1970s (Nordhaus, 1979; Edmonds and Reilly, 1985). In the next decade the Regional 
Acidification INformation and Simulation computer model of acidification in Europe 
was developed (RAINS; Alcamo et al., 1990). Models like the Dynamic and Regional 
Integrated models of Climate and Economy (DICE and RICE; Nordhaus 1994a, 
2007; Nordhaus and Boyer, 2000; Nordhaus, 2008; de Bruin et al., 2009); Global 
Change Assessment Model (GCAM; Edmonds et al., 1994); the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change 
model (MIT; Prinn et al., 1996); Model for Energy Supply Strategy Alternatives and 
their General Environmental Impact (MESSAGE; Messner and Strubegger, 1995); 
Tool to Assess Regional and Global Environmental and Health Targets for 
Sustainability (TARGETS; Rotmans and de Vries, 1997); Integrated Model for the 
Assessment of the Greenhouse Effect (IMAGE; Alcamo et al., 1998); Climate 
Framework for Uncertainty, Negotiation, and Distribution (FUND; Tol, 2002a; Tol, 
2005); Asia-Pacific Integrated Model (AIM; Kainuma et al., 2002); Policy Analysis 
of the Greenhouse Effect (PAGE; Hope et al., 1993; Hope, 2006; Hope, 2009); model 
for evaluating regional and global effects of GHG reduction policies (MERGE; 
Manne et al., 1995; Manne and Richels, 2005); TIMES Integrated Assessment Model 
(TIAM; Loulou and Labriet, 2008; Loulou, 2008); Community Integrated 
Assessment System (CIAS; Warren et al., 2008; Mastrandrea, 2010); and World 
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Induced Technical Change Hybrid model (WITCH; Bosello et al., 2010) consider at 
the same time the costs of mitigation and the social costs of carbon. 
  IAMs can be classified into two different categories. There are policy 
optimization models with which, given a certain policy scenario or goal, key policy 
variables such as carbon emissions control rates are optimized. A further classification 
of policy optimization models is cost-benefit (CBA) and cost-effectiveness analyses. 
In a CBA application the costs of achieving the optimal policy intervention for an 
environmental target are compared with the resulting benefits given a predetermined 
constraint (say a specific level of global temperature increase) while in cost- 
effectiveness the least cost methods of achieving an environmental target are 
preferred over the more expensive ones. Models such as DICE/RICE, FUND and 
MERGE are examples of the optimization policy. 
 The second category of integrated assessment models is referred to policy 
evaluation models known as simulation models. Applying these types of models 
environmental, economic and social consequences of specific policies can be 
calculated. These models include greater complexity in terms of regional detail and 
natural and social processes. Some representative models of this category are the 
AIM, MESSAGE, IMAGE and CIAS. 
 According to Rotmans and Dowlatabadi (1998) integrated assessment models 
are classified in macroeconomic-oriented and biosphere-oriented models. 
Specifically, macroeconomic models are neoclassical models based on a equilibrium 
framework. The ICLIPS model uses a Ramsey economic growth model formulation 
(Tóth et al., 1997) while MIT for the development of Emissions Prediction and Policy 
Analysis (EPPA) model uses a computable economic equilibrium model in a full 
macroeconomic framework (Babiker et al., 2001). A Computable General 
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Equilibrium framework in studying the interactions of energy and environment with 
economy is presented in GEM-E3 (Capros et al., 1995, 1997). Models establishing a 
connection between energy production (consumption) and aggregated macroeconomic 
growth models are ETA-MACRO (Manne, 1981), GLOBAL-2100 (Manne and 
Rishels, 1993), MARKAL-MACRO (Hamilton et al., 1992) and MERGE (Manne and 
Richels, 2005). At the same time biosphere-oriented models are system based models 
entailing geophysical and biogeochemical processes. Finally there is a category which 
combines the characteristics of both orientations known as hybrid models. Examples 
of the tradeoffs of a general equilibrium framework and the dynamic environment are 
the GCAM and the MIT models.  
 Recently, models have been developed that incorporate co-benefits for 
different countries and regions analyses of policies that maximize the benefits 
between air pollution control and greenhouse gas abatement. An example of these 
models is the GAINS model (Amann et al., 2008). 
3.3  Damage costs 
Stern review (Stern, 2007) concludes that serious and early action to control 
GHGs makes sense with the avoided damage costs to outset the associated costs of 
achieving the targeted abatement. In summary it can be said that doing nothing to 
cope with GHGs (Business as Usual, BAU) would imply a climate change damage 
equal to approximately 10.9% reduction in global consumption per capita. 
Stabilization at 550 parts per million CO2e will reduce costs to 1.1% and these costs 
to stabilize at 550 ppm would be approximately 1% of gross world product. The Stern 
review estimated climate change costs by using IAMs and various scenarios for 
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GHGs emissions and concentrations and the associated damage costs corresponding 
to reduced consumption.11 
Damage costs estimations can be found also in the various integrated 
assessment models (IAMs) like DICE, PAGE and FUND. Nordhaus (1994a) presents 
estimates of percentage losses in world’s gross product; Roughgarden and Schneider 
(1999) moving on in the lines of Nordhaus and various other surveys, present a 
damage function and its confidence intervals; Heal and Kriström (2002) and Pizer 
(2006) approach uncertainty by subjective analysis and using experts’ opinions. 
Particularly, Pizer (2003) modified the DICE model (Nordhaus, 1994b) by 
substituting in a more complex way the quadratic relationship between temperature 
change and damage. Nordhaus (2008) presents a range of marginal damages of 
pollutants between $6 and $65/t carbon with a central estimate of $27. In line with the 
Nordhaus’ (2008) estimates, Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon 
(2010) cites a mean cost of $21/t and a $65/t in the 95th% estimate. 
In the case of GHGs air pollution the first cost-benefit analysis is fount in 
Nordhaus (1991) while Tol (2013) cites 16 studies and 17 estimates of climate’s 
change global welfare impacts (Nordhaus 1994a,b, 2006, 2008, 2011; Fankhauser 
1994, 1995;  Tol 1995, 2002a,b; Bosello et al. 2012; Maddison 2003; Mendelsohn et 
al. 2000a,b; Maddison and Rehdanz 2011; Rehdanz and Maddison 2005). 
Specifically, Tol (2013) applying kernel density estimators to 588 estimates expressed 
in US$ 2010 and referring to emissions in the year 2010 offers a list of 75 studies with 
588 estimates of carbon emissions’ social cost. From these studies, Tol finds a mean 
marginal cost of carbon equal to $196 per metric tone of carbon and a mode estimate 
                                                 
11 Future consumption losses have to be discounted to the present by appropriate consumption discount 
rates (d) like  d = ρ + g ε  
where ρ is the social discount rate of time preference. g is the growth rate of average consumption and 
ε the elasticity of the social weight for a consumption change (For more information see Arrow, 2007). 
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of $49/tC; while with 3% and 0% rate of time preference a mean social cost of carbon 
equal to $25/tC and $296/tC respectively is calculated. Obviously using different rates 
of time preference lead to high asymmetry in estimates with higher rates of time 
preference indicating that future climate change costs present a lower present value. 12  
3.4  Uncertainties 
The associated potential effects of climate change are related among others to 
energy demand, human health, agriculture, extinction of species and loss of 
ecosystems etc. The effect of past GHGs on global temperatures is not easy to be 
estimated. The IPCC (2001) claims that in the 20th century, global temperatures 
increased in the range of 0,6±0,2° C and provide a number of possible effects of global 
warming on climate like extreme weather events (with very possible summer droughts 
in continental areas, higher heat waves, etc), tropical storm intensity (hurricanes, etc), 
decomposition of methane hydrates, etc. 
Climate change uncertainties may be distinguished as parametric and 
stochastic (Kelly and Kolstad, 1999; Kann and Weyant 2000; Peterson, 2006). The 
existing IAMs examine mainly the prametric uncertainty attributed to the assumed 
main parameters like climate sensitivity, damage functions etc. According to Golub et 
al. (2011) climate sensitivity and damage functions justify the parametric while 
                                                 
12 Discounting is important. Future costs and damages associated with GHG emissions are expressed 
in present value (PV) terms. PV of €1 received 25 years from now is the amount we have to invest 
today to have €1 in 25 years. At 5%, this is almost 30 cents; at 2.5% this is 54 cents. But mitigation 
cost takes place today, while climate damages appear in the future and thus lower discount rates result 
to higher mitigation costs. The calculation of PV of net benefits requires estimation of benefits and 
costs flows from different competitive projects for each year into (a finite time horizon) future. A 
proper discount rate is chosen and the PV of net benefits is estimated for each year into the future. The 
PV of the total net benefit (TNB) flows are given as:        
PVTNB= (B0–C0)/(1+r)
0 + (B1–C1)/(1+r)
1 +. . .+ (Bn–Cn)/(1+r)
n 
Where C and B are respectively total costs and benefits in a given time period; r is the discount rate; 
and n is the project’s end period (in years) from the current time. (B1 – C1) represents the total net 
benefits one year from the current time; and (1+r)n implies that the sum (1+r) is taken to the end period 
of the project (nth power). 
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temperature and economy’s performance “unresolved” processes justify the stochastic 
component of uncertainty. Golub et al. (2011) discuss analytically the discrete 
uncertainty modeling and the special form of real options analysis to model climate 
policy in case of parametric uncertainty while stochasticity is tackled with the use of 
stochastic dynamic programming.   
Another type of uncertainty stems from the role of clouds, which decrease the 
solar radiation “reaching” earth’s ground by reflecting ultraviolet radiation. This 
implies that increasing clouds may reduce the effect of greenhouse (McKibbin and 
Wilcoxen, 2002). At the same time the existence of aerosols in the atmosphere 
coming from fossil fuels combustion, volcanoes or forests’ burning reflect part of the 
solar radiation and thus reduce climate change. Clouds and aerosols together absorb 
infrared and this increases warming (McKibbin and Wilcoxen, 2002). 
 If uncertainty is absent, the efficient control level of emissions may be 
achieved either by using taxes or tradable permits. But in the case of uncertainty the 
two instruments are different. If marginal costs are flat (steep) and marginal benefits 
steep (flat) then permits (taxes) are preferred. Empirical evidence shows that marginal 
cost curves for controlling GHGs are quite steep with the marginal benefits from 
controlling emissions being flat. Obviously, uncertainty in cost estimates has to be 
tackled carefully. Van Vuuren et al. (2007) taking into consideration a number of 
abatement options, like reductions of non-CO2 emissions, carbon plantations and 
various measures in the energy system find that mitigation scenarios end up to lower 
levels of regional emissions but with increased land use. Cost estimates uncertainty is 
almost 50%.    
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3.5  Evolution of emissions  
We can approximate the evolution of emissions using the concept of the 
Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) hypothesis and the Kaya identity. A number of 
EKC studies consider the factors causing this inverted U-shape pattern relationship 
between environmental damage and per-capita income (for a brief review see Halkos, 
2012).13  
On the other hand, the Kaya identity connects the main factors that determine 
the level of human effect with climate in the form of CO2 emissions. That is  
 CO2 emissions ≡ Population × (GDP/c) × (Energy intensity) × (Carbon intensity)  
where CO2 emissions come from fossil fuels combustion; GDP/c stands for Gross 
Domestic Product per capita representing the standards of living; Energy intensity is 
defined as Energy over GDP; Carbon intensity is defined as CO2 emissions over 
energy.14 Thus policies to reduce emissions must concentrate on more efficient energy 
use (reducing energy per unit of GDP) and fuel switching (reducing carbon intensity 
of energy).15  
Table 3 presents the indices of CO2 emissions and Kaya identity’s main 
factors (reference year 1990=100; OECD/IEA, 2013). The average annual change (in 
%) between the reference year and 2011 is presented in the parentheses. As can be 
                                                 
13 Various efforts have been done in presenting historical or projected data of CO2 emissions. 
Schmalensee et al. (1998) using reduced-form models and country panel data for the time period 1950–
1990 projected CO2 emissions from fossil fuels combustion through to the year 2050 and find evidence 
of an inverted U-shape relationship between CO2 emissions and per-capita income with a turning point 
within the sample. Boden et al. (2012) discuss global, regional and national fossil-fuel CO2 emissions.  
14  Kaya identity differs from the IPAT. The latter reflects the impact of human activity on the 
environment.  That is   I = P×A×T 
where I the Human Influence on the environment; P the population; A stands for the mean 
consumption level (Affluence) for the population with increasing consumption levels to negatively 
affect the environment; and T represents Technology. 
15 If we totally differentiate Kaya’s Identity then this is expressed as growth rates. That is  
    %∆(CO2 emissions)=%∆(Population)+%∆(GDP/c)+% ∆(Energy intensity)+ % ∆(Carbon intensity)  
where ∆ represents changes in percentage (%). That is the percentage change in emissions equals the 
sum of percentage changes in population, GDP/c, energy and carbon intensities. 
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seen the driving forces in the increase of CO2 emissions globally are population and 
GDP/c offsetting energy intensity with carbon intensity to remain stable mainly due to 
continuous use of fossil fuels and slow adaptation of low-carbon alternatives.  
Table 3: Indices of CO2 emissions and Kaya identity’s main factors (reference year 
1990=100). In parentheses the average annual change between reference year and 2011 
 CO2 emissions Population GDP/c Energy intensity Carbon intensity 
World 149 (1.9%) 132 (1.3%) 148 (1.9%) 77 (-1.2%) 100 (0.0%) 
Annex I Parties   96 (-0.2%) 110 (0.5%) 135 (1.4%) 70 (-1.7%) 93 (-0.3%) 
Non-Annex I Parties 261 (4.7%) 138 (1.5%) 220 (3.8%) 77 (-1.2%) 112 (0.5%) 
Annex I Kyoto Parties    88 (-0.8%) 104 (0.2%) 132 (1.3%) 70 (-1.7%) 91 (-0.4%) 
Annex II Parties 106 (0.3%) 114 (0.6%) 132 (1.3%) 74 (-1.4%) 95 (-0.3%) 
Annex II North America 110 (0.4%) 125 (1.1%) 133 (1.4%) 69 (-1.7%)   95 (-0.20%) 
Annex II Europe 93 (-0.3%) 110 (0.4%) 132 (1.3%) 74 (-1.4%) 87 (-0.7%) 
Annex II Asia Ocania 120 (0.9%) 108 (0.3%) 121 (0.9%) 86 (-0.7%) 107 (0.3%) 
Non-OECD Total 194 (3.2%) 135 (1.5%) 198 (3.3%) 68 (-1.8%) 106 (0.3%) 
OECD Total 111 (0.5%) 117 (0.7%) 135 (1.4%) 75 (-1.4%) 94 (-0.3%) 
Source: Highlights © OECD/IEA (2013). 
 
In more details, Table 4 presents the total and per capita CO2 emissions in 
million tons and in kg respectively by sector in the year 2011 with the last column to 
display the percentage change in CO2 emissions in the time period 1990-2010 
(OECD/IEA, 2013). Similarly, Table 5 presents CO2 emissions in the year 2011 per 
Total Primary Energy Supply (TPES), per GDP in Purchasing Power Parity and per 
capita with percentage changes in parentheses for the time period 1990-2010 
(OECD/IEA, 2013).  
 
Table 4: Total (in million tons) and per capita (in kg) CO2 emissions by sector in 
2011 (CO2/c in parentheses)  
 Electricity and  
 heat production 
Other Energy 
industry own 
Use 
Manufacturing 
Industry and 
Construction 
 
Transport 
 
Other sectors 
 
% Change 
1990-2010 
Annex I Parties 5589.5 (4324) 663.6 (513) 1956.9 (1514) 3386.6 (2620) 1758.3 (1360) -3.9 
Non-Annex I Parties 7477.2 (1320) 879.3 (155) 4551.7 (803) 2500.9 (441) 1464.6 (259) 160.8 
Annex I Kyoto Parties 3234.2 (3606) 384.8 (429) 1290.5 (1439) 1691.2 (1886) 1112.8 (1241) -12.1 
Non-OECD 8154.6 (1426) 857.6 (150) 4740.9 (829) 2557.2 (447) 1577.5 (276) 94 
OECD 4912.1 (3960) 685.2 (552) 1767.8 (1426) 3330.2 (2685) 1645.5 (1326) 10.7 
USA 2212 (7089) 266 (852) 597.9 (1916) 1638.1 (5250) 573.2 (1837) 8.6 
OECD Europe 1353.6 (2439) 182.5 (329) 590.8 (1065) 936.5 (1688) 683.6 (1232) -5.2 
EU-27 1320 (2622) 168 (334) 547.3 (1087) 891.5 (1771) 615.9 (1224) -12.6 
Non-OECD Europe/Eurasia 1399.4 (4121) 138.1 (407) 478.1 (1408) 384.8 (1133) 342.6 (1009) -31.2 
Africa 412.2 (394) 39.9 (38) 163 (156) 245.9 (235) 106.7 (102) 77.7 
World 13066.8 (1878) 1542.9 (222) 6508.7 (935) 7001.1 (1006) 3222.9 (463) 49.3 
Source: Highlights © OECD/IEA (2013). 
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Table 5: CO2 emissions in 2011 per Total Primary Energy Supply (TPES), per GDP in    
Purchasing Power Parity and per capita (% changes in parentheses for 1990-2011)  
 CO2 / TPES 
(in tons CO2/terajoule) 
CO2 / GDP PPP 
(in kg CO2/US 2005 $) 
CO2/ Population 
(in CO2/c) 
Annex I Parties 55.3   (-7.0) 0.36    (-35.2)   10.33    (-12.6) 
Non-Annex I Parties    57.7    (11.9) 0.52    (-13.8)   2.98     (89.4) 
Annex I Kyoto Parties     53.7    (-8.6) 0.33    (-36.1)    8.60    (-15.7) 
Non-OECD  57.4    (5.7) 0.55    (-27.7)   3.13    (43.4) 
OECD   55.6      (-5.6) 0.33    (-29.6)  9.95    (-5.1) 
USA   57.6    (-5.1) 0.40    (-34.6)    16.94    (-12.9) 
OECD Europe     51    (-12.5) 0.25    (-36.9)    6.75     (-14.5) 
EU-27     51.2   (-13.5) 0.25    (-40.2)    7.04     (-17.9) 
Non-OECD Europe / Eurasia     55.7   (-10.1) 0.75    (-40.0)    8.08     (-30.5) 
Africa   33   (-0.4) 0.34    (-15.7) 0.93     (7.7) 
World   57.1    (0.0) 0.45    (-23.2)  4.50    (13.5) 
Source: Highlights © OECD/IEA (2013). 
 
Production using energy creates entropy, which increases when the initial 
useful energy is turned to redundant energy that cannot be converted into work. The 
existing mass of living organisms in an area is the biomass. Fossil fuels originate from 
biomass existing long time before human beings. The existence of biomass and its 
availability depends on the existence of lands and waters. The necessary areas to 
supply the required ecological services to maintain life can be assessed by the notion 
of the ECological Footprint (ECF). The notion approximates the area needed to 
supply what a society or an economy needs to consume as well as to absorb the 
resulting wastes16.  
If we distinguish between renewable and non-renewable energy then the latter 
are finite and may be exhausted if we have an irrational use.17 In terms of the 
ecological footprint and by using the IPAT equation, the total environmental effect 
can be approximated as: 
  Effect = Population x (GDP/c) x (ECF/GDP)  
In this way it is obvious that ecological footprint must be less than the available area.  
 
                                                 
16 We assume that the total waste emissions are lower that the assimilative capacity of the environment 
to absorb them.  In the case of carbon, economic growth with reduced carbon footprint requires low 
carbon growth.  
17 For sustainability it is necessary to assume that harvesting rates are lower than the rates of 
regeneration. 
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3.5.1  Impact of financial crisis on emissions projections 
Global financial crisis is an interesting issue in terms of affecting emissions 
projections. Peters et al. (2012) showed that the level of global CO2 emissions from 
burning fossil-fuels and cement production increased almost 6% in 2010 surpassing 9 
billion metric tones of carbon and offsetting more than the 1.4% decrease in 2009. 
They show that the impact of the financial crisis of the years 2008–2009 on emissions 
has a short-run character due to the significant increase of emissions in emerging 
countries and the return to high emissions in developed countries accompanied with 
higher fossil-fuel intensity globally.  
Recently all major organizations (like among others IEA, OECD, McKinsey 
and Company and IIASA) have updated their projections including the effect of 
financial crisis on emissions. The results are similar and reveal a modest impact of 
financial crisis on emissions. Specifically, for 2020 and 2030 emissions projections 
only about 6% appear to have dropped relative to estimates before the global financial 
crisis (McKinsey and Company, 2010). This small impact appears to be more 
significant in developed countries than in developing countries. In a by-sector 
analysis, sectors which are linked to GDP appear to be more affected than sectors 
which are not linked to GDP. On the one hand, examples of sectors linked to GDP are 
the power, industry and services sectors. On the other hand, sectors such as 
agriculture, forestry and waste generation are linked with population and not with 
GDP, therefore they suffer less or no impact from crisis.   
 There are three reasons for this modest change relative to the pre-crisis results. 
Firstly, projections are made using long historical time series and consider a large 
time period towards 2030. Therefore, financial crisis is a relatively small time period. 
Second, a number of large developing countries such as China, which produce a large 
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amount of emissions, are less exposed to the crisis or their economic systems have 
been adapted well to the new economic reality. Last, some sectors like agriculture, 
forestry and waste generation are not linked with GDP and are not affected by the 
crisis.  
 The modest reduction in emissions projection has not altered the total 
abatement potential relative to the pre-crisis period. However, there might be slightly 
lower abatement costs and lower fossil fuels prices. It is very important for the 
countries to continue their efforts for emissions reductions as any delay may result in 
a less abatement potentials in the future. 
 
4.  Costs of abatement: concepts and methods of calculation 
4.1  Costs associated with emissions control  
Hourcade et al. (1996) distinguish four types of costs associated with 
emissions control: direct, partial and general equilibrium and nonmarket costs.18 The 
first classification of direct costs refers to the abatement unit used to control emissions 
or insulate houses or substituting high carbon content fuels with low. The partial 
equilibrium costs include the direct costs but take into consideration the reduction in 
producer and consumer surpluses caused by the increase in GHG emissions which is 
not traded in the economy. For instance if the price of oil increases both producers 
and consumers adjust to the increased price by keeping other prices constant.  
The general equilibrium costs include all economic costs of GHG emissions 
abatement. Kolstad and Toman (2005) explain this cost distinction using as an 
example the sequence of an increase in the price of carbon, the expected fall in the 
(net of tax) price of oil, the negative effect on the oil industry and the consequences 
                                                 
18 Jaffe et al. (1995) propose other costs like transaction and government administration.  
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for enterprises supplying inputs to oil industry, to local industry depending on the 
income workers earn from the oil industry. These secondary impacts from these 
sectoral effects are not usually elevated in the partial equilibrium costs distinction. 
Finally, we may have nonmarket costs outside the markets as long run unemployment 
due to policies that restrict GHG emissions and the human burden of unemployment 
includes nonmonetary factors (Kolstad and Toman, 2005). 
 Next let us consider the cost curves for abating emissions, the methods of 
constructing them before we proceed in the next session to their use in policy making.  
4.2 Methods of constructing abatement cost curves 
  Two different approaches to energy-economy modeling exist.19 Bottom-up or 
engineering models and top-down or economic models are the two modeling 
approaches which lead to very different properties and model results according to the 
analyses of emissions and abatement costs. Bottom-up modeling is based on 
disaggregation and technical parameters, whereas top-down modeling is based on 
aggregation and on macroeconomic principles. Mixture or integrated engineering and 
economic models may also be used to construct an abatement cost curve.  
4.2.1  Bottom-up or engineering models  
In this case emissions abatement objectives are defined and all potential 
methods to accomplish this target are listed. For each method, the costs on pollution 
control installation are estimated together with various other costs like initial 
investments, fuels used, operation and maintenance, labour and electricity, etc. Next, 
the total costs imposed to each firm are estimated extracting the total control cost 
curve. 
                                                 
19 Initially a simplified method is to construct a supply abatement curve. According to Jackson (1991), 
Naucler and Enkvist (2009) and Kesicki (2010) a supply curve combines the options for supplying 
energy given demand side options in order to adopt cost effective method of reducing emissions of 
CO2. 
 27 
 A bottom-up model as disaggregated model in order to estimate structural 
changes in the economy is necessary to have available data regarding technologies, 
the diffusion rate of facilities and the rate of use to capacity. Particularly, bottom-up 
models describe the demand and supply in a disaggregated way in order to estimate 
potentials which for example refer to substitution of technologies with low carbon 
emissions. 
  The bottom-up approach describes current and potential technologies in 
detail. It also describes past and present technologies using quantitative data. The 
purpose is to convert them to desired services and alternative technologies that can 
provide the same services but with less energy consumption (Wilson and Swisher, 
1993; Bohringer and Rutherford, 2009; Loschel, 2002; van Vuuren et al., 2009). More 
specifically, it investigates how an individual technology can be applied or how can 
be substituted so as to provide energy services. Bottom-up models are solutions 
oriented in terms of trying to find a cost-effective strategy to use as little energy as 
possible to provide a given level of energy services (Wilson and Swisher, 1993).  
 The analysts of bottom-up modeling propose the substitution of technologies 
with more energy efficient ones. They also estimate the impacts of these investments 
on energy demand by developing scenarios that describe cost-effective potentials for 
implementing energy demand and supply side technologies. The calculation of the 
potential is based on summing the net costs of technology options. Hence, the 
technology options are ranked as the costs increase drawing graphically a marginal 
cost curve or supply curve of emissions reductions or conserved energy. The crucial 
assumptions of bottom-up modeling to take into account are the costs, total energy 
consumption of a country, the lifetimes of technologies and alternative technologies, 
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fuel and electricity costs and potential rates of technologies (Wilson and Swisher, 
1993).  
 There are various bottom-up approaches like econometric models, 
optimization and simulation modelling and accounting frameworks (Jacobsen, 1998). 
In econometric models socio-economic variables are included endogenously so as to 
explain the evolution of structural and behavioral changes although unexpected 
shocks of weather cannot be included and as a consequence the results of the analysis 
of the econometric relations are biased. Optimization models usually rely on linear 
programming and various constraints to derive the least cost ways of achieving a 
targeted energy demand. In this approach consumer choices are included assuming 
rationality in consumer’s behavior and no market imperfections. Simulation modeling 
imitates energy users and producers using various indications like prices, incomes etc. 
Its purpose is to simulate variables such as energy prices and technology costs in 
order to calculate the potentials of energy savings and substitutions.  
On the other hand accounting modelling frameworks examine explicitly the 
decision outcomes by considering the effects of various scenarios attaining a certain 
target like, for instance, the costs and benefits (in energy savings and emission 
reductions) in using renewable energy sources. But accounting models lack important 
dynamics and the changes in socio-economic variables are difficult to be assessed and 
interpreted. Moreover, variables that would be crucial to be circulated endogenously 
in the model are presumed to be exogenous.  
Here we may consider the Long-range Energy Alternatives System (LEAP) as 
an evolution of the energy system models. LEAP is a flexible modeling environment 
allowing us to build applications appropriate to specific problems at different 
geographical levels (cities, countries, regions or globally). The model is based on 
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accounting framework to create appropriate energy demand and supply relying on 
physical representation of the energy system. It also uses different scenarios to 
explain the appropriate possible pathways of the evolution of the energy system. 20  
 The energy system in many bottom-up models is not necessarily optimal. As a 
consequence many cost-efficient technologies are not used because of barriers to 
implement them. Another weakness of this type of approach is that bottom-up models 
only partially represent the economy and they do not include market responses. 
Bottom up models characteristic is the representation of technology which allows 
simulating the actual sector in partial equilibrium setting (Tuladhar et al., 2009; 
Bohringer and Rutherford, 2008). Additionally this type of models includes an 
excessive number of exogenous variables something that is a factor which can cause 
deviations from reality. Also there is a difficulty to estimate macroeconomic costs in 
terms of GDP. Microeconomic costs can be calculated using cost-benefit analysis. 
However there is interdependence between macroeconomic and microeconomic 
analysis due to   interdependence of indicators. These approaches often neglect the 
macroeconomic impact of energy policies (Tuladhar et al., 2009; Bohriger and 
Rutherford, 2009; van Vuuren et al., 2009). 
4.2.2  Top-down or economic models 
These are models relying on aggregate economic variables and their 
relationships as determined by the economic theory. That is the top-down approach, 
assuming efficient markets, uses aggregate data to assess the benefits and costs of the 
impact of emissions control (like GHG mitigation) on income and GDP. It also 
considers the changes to the economy caused by these mitigation efforts. A number of 
                                                 
20 As climate change demands the consideration of very LR time periods (more than a 100 years), 
researchers started using LEAP model, which has been applied as the standard way in national 
communications for the UNFCCC reporting. In the supply-side the model uses accounting and 
simulation approaches in order to provide answers under alternative possible development scenarios to 
“what-if” type of analysis.  
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assumptions are required which may not correspond to real world markets. There are 
mainly three top-down modeling approaches: macroeconomic, input-output and 
computable general equilibrium. 
Top-down models take into account initial distortions of the market, spillovers 
and income effects for households or government (Bohringer and Rutherford, 2008; 
2009; Wing, 2008; van Vuuren et al., 2009; Jacobsen, 1998). This category of models 
can be identified into two sub-categories.  The first incorporates primal simulations of 
an aggregate Ramsey growth model with the environmental sector to be based on 
historical data. For instance, DICE and RICE models belong in this category. The 
second type of top-down models includes dual computable general equilibrium 
simulations (CGE) or optimal growth model as for example the MIT Emissions 
Prediction and Policy Analysis (EPPA) model (Paltsev et al. 2005). CGE models are 
based on maximization of utility, minimization of cost and market equilibrium for 
goods. Top-down models greatest advantage is that assess the feedbacks effects 
between energy system and prices, commodity substitution, income and economic 
welfare (Wing, 2008).   
“Top-down” CGE models divide the world into economically important 
regions and model demand and supply for commodities in all sectors of economy. 
Relationships are estimated econometrically or are calibrated. Models are solved for 
equilibrium before and after a shock (say introduction of carbon tax in the economy). 
They estimate costs of mitigation by imposing a worldwide carbon tax. Tax causes 
substitution of low for high carbon fuel with this cost corresponding to mitigation 
cost. Then by comparing the values of the associated variables in the base and 
shocked case, cost estimates are derived. 
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4.2.3 Integrated engineering-economic models  
 Another way to construct abatement cost curves is to rely on cost estimates as 
extracted by combining engineering and economic models. Recently, there is a wide 
effort to combine the characteristics of the two approaches into one. Hybrid modeling 
is the attempt to join a technological bottom-up with a top-down macroeconomic 
framework, in terms of integrating engineering data and macroeconomic accounts 
(Hourcade et al., 2006; Bohringer and Rutherford, 2008; Wing, 2008). According to 
Bohringer and Rutherford (2008) there are three different approaches of hybrid 
models. Initially bottom-up and top-down models can be combined but the two 
models are developed independently with the consequence of inconsistencies. 
Second, bottom-up models can incorporate macro-economic feedbacks or top-down 
models can incorporate technological explicitness (Hourcade et al., 2006). The last 
approach represents totally integrated models based on solution algorithms. Research 
as regards to hybrid modeling include Jaccard et al. (2004), Bohringer (1998), 
Jacobsen (1998), Koopmans and te Velde (2001), Bohringer et al. (2003), Frei et al. 
(2003), Kumbaroglu and Madlener (2003), McFarland et al.(2004), Bohringer and 
Rutherford (2008) and Wing (2008).  
4.2.3.1       Bottom-up versus top-down models 
Top-down and bottom-up approaches are different because of the different 
domain that each approach represents (IPCC, 2001). Top-down estimates of 
abatement costs are usually high compared to bottom-up as the latter are optimistic in 
determining feasible cost-effective methods to control GHGs. A number of other 
factors apart from technological feasibility may increase abatement costs (Kolstad and 
Toman, 2005; Jaffe et al., 1995). Top-down modeling may be useful in exploring the 
macroeconomic impact of fiscal environmental policies like environmental taxation 
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while bottom-up modeling helps in exploring specific effects of control methods on 
different sectors.  
GHGs mitigation may lead to benefits from the reduced damages. In Stern’s 
(2007) review, the high climate scenario among various scenarios shows increasing 
damages of the climate change in the case of BAU policy. Specifically, by the year 
2200 the GNP losses are expected at a level of almost 14%.   
Various researchers apply energy economic models to estimate the costs of 
CO2 control options (Morthorst, 1994; Maya and Fenhann, 1994; Amous et al., 1994; 
Mahgary et al., 1994; Halsnses et al., 1994). Mosnaim (2001) applies a bottom-up 
approach to estimate the costs of CO2 emissions abatement and sequestration 
alternatives in Clile. Ribbenhed et al. (2007) using a bottom-up approach rank 
abatement options to reduce CO2 emissions in the Swedish iron ore-based 
steelmaking sector. Hasanbeigi et al. (2010) constructed a bottom-up CO2 abatement 
cost curve for the Thai cement industry to determine the potentials and costs of CO2 
abatement, taking into account the costs and CO2 abatement of different technologies. 
According to Blok et al. (2001) an integrated modelling analysis of the energy system 
and the associated emissions with the PRIMES model developed by the National 
Technical University of Athens (or 'top-down approach'), and an engineering-
economic analysis of individual emission reduction options(or 'bottom-up approach'), 
based on sector studies performed by Ecofys and AEA technology and analysed with 
the GENESIS database. 
Moreover the paper of Novikova (2009) aims to address this gap in knowledge 
and summarizes the results of research aimed at quantifying the potential to improve 
electric efficiency and reduce electricity-associated CO2 emissions from the 
Hungarian tertiary sector up to the year 2025 as a function of cost of conserved CO2. 
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To achieve the research purpose, a database of CO2 mitigation technologies and 
practices has been created and a bottom-up model has been developed to estimate the 
baseline final electricity consumption and associated CO2 emissions from Hungarian 
tertiary buildings and conduct individual and incremental assessment of mitigation 
options in terms of their potential for CO2 emission abatement and costs resulted from 
deployment of these mitigation options in the sector. 
4.3  Marginal Abatement Cost curves 
 Marginal abatement cost (MAC) curves is a key tool which has been 
developed since the early 1990s to illustrate the costs associated with carbon 
mitigation and to contribute to determining optimal level of pollution control (Halkos 
and Kitsou, 2014; Beaumont and Tinch, 2004; McKintrick, 1999). Policy makers try 
to introduce and implement a concrete and consistent policy to achieve the desirable 
emissions reduction. The authorities or the decisions makers seek to maximize control 
efforts under their budget constraints. 
 More specifically, an abatement cost curve as a graph depicts the cost of the 
emissions reduction. Marginal costs increase as we switch between abatement 
methods with the abatement rising to the maximum feasible level. In this way the 
MAC curve is a discontinuous step function presenting a staircase shape with each 
step representing a specific control method. That is each step of this stepwise curve 
represents solely one technological option and the level of each step shows the 
additional cost of an abatement method relative to the maximum incremental amount 
of the pollutant abated by introducing that method (Halkos, 1992; 1995; 2010). The 
height of each step represents the cost of € per tone of CO2 abated and the width 
refers to the magnitude of emission reduction for each mitigation option. The 
sequence of cost-effective abatement methods provides us with the long-run MAC. 
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 As with any pollutant, the challenge is to reduce GHG emissions in a cost-
effective way with the total annualized cost divided by the annual tonnes of emissions 
removed to be minimized. Assuming "cost-effectiveness" in the potential application of 
the abatement techniques for a given method in a given pollution source implies 
achievement of the highest reduction at the lowest cost. Thus cheaper options have to 
be preferred compared to more costly ones as it would be inefficient to use the most 
costly abatement methods first if there are cheaper alternatives. In this way national 
abatement cost curves exhibit non-decreasing marginal costs and the most cost-
effective techniques will be the appropriate control methods for the national decision 
maker.  
Control methods may differ in applicability as well as in costs. Abatement 
costs are independent of the order of application and technologies applied for the 
abatement of emissions are scale specific. That is constant returns to scale are 
assumed with fixed abatement coefficients over the abatement range at which each 
abatement method is efficient. At the same time, both fuel use and costs are assumed 
given independently of abatement policy with the existence of a competitive market 
for abatement methods which is accessible to all European countries at the same 
conditions. Moreover, the mitigation options are assessed for a specific year.21 Figure 
2 presents an example of the marginal abatement cost curve for F-gases control for the 
EU-27 in 2020 (Halkos, 2010).  
   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
21 This approach however includes flaws such as not taking into account neither the potential 
interdependencies between the options in the system nor the intertemporal dynamics nor the indirect 
costs such as implementation, search cost or financial costs (Ekins et al., 2011; Kesicki, 2010; 
Morthorst, 1994). 
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Figure 2: F-gases abatement cost curve for EU-27 in 2020 
 
Source: Halkos (2010). 
  
 Following Halkos (1992, 1995; 1996a,b) the abatement cost of an emission 
control method (say Fluidized Bed Combustion) is given by the total annualized cost 
(TAC) of a control method, including capital and operating cost components. That is: 
( )
1 (1 ) n
r
TAC TCC VOMC FOMC
r −
  
= + +  − +  
  (1) 
where TCC represents the total capital cost (using investments as a measure for total 
capital cost); VOMC and FOMC: variable and fixed operational and maintenance cost 
respectively; r/[1 - (1 + r )-n] reflects the capital recovery factor at a real discount rate 
r, converting a capital cost to an equivalent stream of equal annual future payments, 
considering the time value of money (represented by r). Finally, n is the economic life 
of the asset (in years). For the economic and technical assumptions in cost calculations 
see Halkos (1992; 1995; 2010). The calculation of annual operating and maintenance 
costs requires the availability of the pollutant’s content in fuel used (e.g. content of 
pollutant in coal used in an industrial unit), the annual operating hours, the assumed 
abatement efficiency of the installed abatement unit, as well as country specific 
conditions like fuel prices, capacity/vehicles utilization and emission factors. Growth 
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rates in industrial productivity and in population are important factors of abatement 
costs in controlling GHGs. 
 Alternatively we can use USEPA’s (2006) methodology in order to construct a 
MAC curve. USEPA defines as the abatement method’s breakeven price the carbon 
price where a method’s costs equal to benefits. The calculation of the breakeven price 
is presented below (modified from USEPA, 2006): 
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Where P represents the breakeven price of the option (€/tCO2eq); CC is the one-time 
capital cost of the option (€); t represents the tax rate (%); PR stands for the 
pollutant’s emissions reduction achieved by the method applied (MtCO2eq); RC is the 
operating and maintenance cost of the adopted method (€/year); TR reflects the total 
revenues generated from energy production (scaled on regional energy prices) or sales 
of abatement by-products or change in agricultural commodity prices (€); N is the 
method’s lifetime (in years); and d stands for the discount rate. 
 Figure 3 presents a hypothetical abatement cost curve for global CO2 
emissions reduction.22 Specifically, it presents a hypothetical calculation of the 
maximum potential abatement of some possible and feasible control methods. Their 
order of introduction may change according to country conditions and requirements. 
As can be seen Figure 3 shows significant amounts of negative costs. That is the 
abatement cost curve (as in McKinsey and Company’s and Kesicki’s abatement cost 
curves) does not only include positive costs but presents also negative costs. Many of 
negative cost opportunities involve energy efficiency measures while some may 
                                                 
22 Examples of constructed abatement cost curves can be fount in McKinsey and Company’s global 
GHG abatement cost curve beyond business as usual for the year 2030 and in Kesicki (2011, p. 3) with 
an expert based derived CO2 abatement cost curve.  
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involve land use, especially in countries with large tropical forest areas. The 
abatement options with negative cost may be defined in the literature as no regrets 
mitigation options. The existence of negative costs means that the society benefits 
from the specified mitigation actions. 
Ekins et al. (2011) mention that in the case of the McKinsey abatement cost 
curve as the project costs are correctly estimated, the explanation of these negative 
costs may be based on the insufficient definition of the extensive cost, the 
implementation of non-financial barriers or inconsistent discount rates. Further, they 
note that markets are not perfect and suffer from various imperfections. So, the cost 
curve cannot assume rational agents, perfect information and no transaction costs. 
Ackerman and Bueno (2011) present an overview of the McKinsey and Company’s 
results and discuss the controversy about the meaning of the negative abatement costs. 
They mention that for this phenomenon McKinsey is not alone as there are bottom-up 
studies for energy savings and emission reductions which have negative cost options. 
Figure 3: A hypothetical CO2 abatement cost curve 
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 In order to avoid the academic controversy about the interpretation of negative 
cost investment opportunities they offer a new method. Their method obtains 
estimates which are in some respects comparable to other bottom-up analysis of 
energy costs. Finally, they note that, according to Brown (2001, p. 1199) there are a 
range of market failures (like distortionary fiscal and regulatory policies, unprized 
costs and benefits, imperfect information) and market barriers (like low attention to 
energy issues, capital market barriers and incomplete markets for energy efficiency) 
that explain the existence of an efficiency gap. This disparity is the difference 
between the actual energy efficiency level of investment and the higher potential cost-
beneficial level from the consumer’s side.  
 
5.  Basic policy approaches for reducing GHGs          
 The construction of abatement cost curves increases the environmental 
awareness of firms in terms of giving insight into the most cost-efficient measures to 
abate emissions (Beaumont and Tinch, 2004). Furthermore, they provide knowledge 
regarding command and control regulations to tackle market imperfections in the field 
of energy efficiency, conservation in buildings, industry and transport (Kesicki, 
2010). 
GHGs abatement costs are uncertain and differ among countries. Various 
studies have been carried out determining the marginal abatement cost of controlling 
GHGs by calculating a carbon tax imposed on the carbon content of the fossil fuels 
burned. In the USA the carbon tax ranges from $94 - $400 /t of carbon (2000 US $) to 
reduce GHGs to 93% of 1990 levels by 2010 (satisfying the Kyoto Protocol target) 
(IPCC, 2001). Similarly in the case of European OECD countries the tax on carbon to 
reduce emissions ranges from $25 to $825 / t of carbon. 
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 Looking again at Figure 3 and following Kesicki (2011, p. 12) and McKinsey 
and Company (2009, p. 57) it can be seen that the derived MAC curve may be used 
by decision makers to establish effective policies to tackle global warming.23 The left 
part of the figure requires attention to coping with market imperfections by imposing 
appropriate regulations. The middle part of the MAC may lead to the effective 
policies by the adoption of market-based policies (taxes and tradable permits) while 
the right part of the curve may require more innovation and RandD.  
In general we may have direct regulations, provision of financial incentives, 
taxation on polluters equivalent to the marginal external social costs (in the concept 
of Pigou taxation), allocation of property rights (Coasean approach) linked with 
emissions trading with the economic instruments (carbon tax or tradable permits) 
necessary to drive to a low carbon economy. A regulatory standard fixes neither 
however it provides the framework where the firms operate (Ellerman, 2000). 
Environmental taxes were widely used in order to achieve environmental objectives, 
but the last years tradable permits are quickly gaining ground. The growing 
popularity of tradable permits is an outcome of the economic advantages they offer 
because they have the ability to equalize marginal abatement costs among all 
controlled sources and they assure least-cost compliance with a particular 
environmental goal (Egenhofer, 2007). Next we discuss the emissions trading scheme 
and the experience with their applications so far. 
 
 
                                                 
23 Halkos and Kevork (2014) claim that percentiles estimation is important in decision making. They 
show the significance in analyzing the effects of various environmental policies in different percentiles 
of the marginal distribution of an environmental variable like the CO2 annual emissions intensity 
avoiding the usual problems arising from using the mean as the only statistical parameter. In this way 
the constructed confidence intervals are more realistic and can be used effectively by the decision 
makers in their environmental policies.  
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5.1  Emissions Trading Schemes 
Emissions trading schemes could provide the framework for international 
cooperation among countries because in the GHG emissions problem the location of 
the polluter country is irrelevant as it is a cross-border issue. The principal problem of 
GHG emissions is that they diffuse quickly in the atmosphere, so that a tone of CO2 
emitted contributes the same in global emissions regardless the location of the emitter 
country (Solomon and Lee, 2000).  
In an emissions trading framework, an environmental authority sets a target or 
a cap on total emissions and then issues emission permits, where the total number of 
permits equals the cap. In order to establish a market for emissions permits, the 
environmental authority has to decide about: who will participate in the market, the 
number of emissions permits that will be available in the market and how the permits 
will be allocated (Kruger et al., 2007). The last decision can be done either by 
auctioning or by grandfathering or a combination of them. Emissions trading is used 
as a means of an interchange and can take two forms which are “allowance-based 
trading or cap-and-trade” and “credit-based trading”. Allowance-based trading 
assumes a fixed cap on aggregate emissions and tradable emission rights while credit-
based trading is about trading of emission rights (Ellerman, 2000). Emissions trading 
can be seen as a means towards the reduction of any possible inefficiency of the 
defined standards. However, emission permits have received much criticism about 
their immoral nature with the main objection being that permits give someone the 
“right to pollute”. 
Emissions’ trading scheme is an American institutional innovation in 
environmental regulation. Among other trading schemes, the American Trading 
Scheme for SO2 was the first successful Trading Scheme. The value of SO2 
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allowances that issued per year was up to €2.8-8.7 billion while other trading schemes 
such as American NOX trading programs issued allowances up to €1.1 billion (Grubb 
and Neuhoff, 2006). United States has brought emissions trading into Kyoto Protocol 
discussions which met the firm opposition from the European Union (Ellerman and 
Buchner, 2007). However, as we will present later, the EU has adopted the emissions 
trading as its core element of the European environmental policy. 
The first major step towards the global adoption of emissions trading schemes was 
made by the commitment of countries in the Kyoto protocol. The commitment that 
every country has signed in Kyoto protocol is to limit its GHG emissions to some 
percentage of 1990 emissions on an average annual basis over a five-year of the First 
Commitment Period (2008-2012). This commitment can be fulfilled by any means but 
the protocol favors emissions trading. Although “emission permits” are not referred in 
the Protocol, it includes “assigned annual amounts” which is basically the same and 
they may be acquired or transferred. In addition it provides a framework for these 
permits where Annex-B countries (the countries that signed the Kyoto Protocol) can 
re-allocate the permits among themselves. Furthermore, as shown in sub-section 2.1, 
the Protocol promotes two very important mechanisms, the Joint Implementation (JI) 
and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). In JI a country finances an emissions 
reduction project in another country and in CDM trading can take place with a non-
Annex B country. 
The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) is the largest 
emissions trading scheme and the first large scale emissions trading scheme for 
carbon dioxide emissions. The EU has committed to reduce the GHGs emissions by 
8% according to 1990 levels under the Kyoto Protocol (Bredin and Muckley, 2011). 
The principal idea of the EU ETS system is an overall cap on total emissions in all 30 
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member states that is equal to the target of Kyoto Protocol in order to meet the EU 
commitments. The EU ETS deals with the CO2 emissions by creating a framework for 
the energy-intensive industrial plants and electric utilities in EU to trade emission 
permits for CO2 (Kruger et al., 2007). These emissions permits are called European 
Union Allowances (EUAs) and the three main markets for these allowances are: 
Powernext, Nord Pool and European Climate Exchange (Daskalakis et al., 2009). The 
EU ETS is a ‘‘bottom-up’’ and decentralized scheme, with each of the member states 
responsible for the allocations, the registry and the compliance. The EU ETS is 
covering approximately 13,000 sources and the value of the EUAs distributed is equal 
to about €22-66 billion (Grubb and Neuhoff, 2006).  
The EU ETS is divided into three periods. First is the trial trading period 
(2005–2007) which is not part of any commitment under the Kyoto Protocol. The 
second EU ETS trading period (2008–2012) coincides with the first five-year 
commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol. Finally, in the post-2012 period no 
commitment has been made but the EU ETS is expected to continue regardless of 
what happens to the Kyoto Protocol. Anger (2008) studies the possibility to link EU 
ETS with other non-European schemes such as Canadian, Australian or Japanese. The 
author argues that this linkage should be the desirable global environmental goal as it 
would be beneficial for both energy-intensive and non-energy-intensive countries 
yielding lower adjustment and compliance costs and a larger emissions market. There 
are some notable differences among the phases such as that in the trial period 
countries are allowed to auction up to 5% of their total EUAs and 10% during the 
second phase. In addition, in the trial period the EU ETS only covers CO2 emissions 
from large emitters in the heat and power generation industry and in selected energy-
intensive industrial sectors (Ellerman, 2008). 
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The price of the EUAs is defined by the member states and naturally the 
bigger the share of a country, the bigger the influence it has on the price. The five 
member states with the highest shares at the trial period are Germany, the UK, 
Poland, Italy and Spain (Convery and Redmond, 2007). The non-compliance with EU 
ETS results in penalty fines. Thus, enterprises which emit more than the EUAs they 
hold at the end of the accounting period must pay a fine which is 40€ for each metric 
ton of CO2 during the trial period and 100€ during the second period (Kettner et al., 
2007). 
A number of studies investigate the problems and drawbacks of the EU ETS. 
Jepma (2003) argues that EU ETS has no clear link with the environmental policies of 
the EU countries. In addition, the author considers the possibility the EU ETS to 
distort the competition in EU and questions the future perspective of the scheme. 
Ellerman (2008) signifies the importance of a central coordinating organization for 
the EU ETS. Additionally, the mechanism should incorporate a number of benefits for 
compliance in order to encourage the participation in the scheme. Last but not least, 
the author points to a number of issues such as harmonization, differentiation and 
stringency. Also, a number of studies question the level of stringency in the 
mechanism. Demailly and Quirion (2008) investigate the impact of the mechanism’s 
stringency and find that no negative effect emerges from the level of stringency. 
The EU ETS covers about 45% of total EU CO2 emissions (Betz and Sato, 
2006). This percentage is not sufficient for EU to meet the Kyoto targets and 
therefore, member states are encouraged to adopt national environmental strategies in 
order to accomplish the Kyoto targets (Bohringer et al., 2006). For instance, the 
Norwegian environmental policy relies entirely on emissions trading in order to meet 
the Kyoto targets. The Norwegian Emissions Trading Scheme is a more 
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comprehensive system than the EU ETS because it includes all GHGs. The 
Norwegian scheme is set to begin at the start of the second EU ETS period at 2008. 
There is a debate in Norway about the allocation of the permits with quite interesting 
results. The majority of the parties (six out of eleven) recommended auctioning. The 
second recommendation was about grandfathering while the third opinion was 
undecided (Ellerman, 2000).  
The UK Emissions Trading Scheme is also inspired by the Kyoto Protocol but 
it is not as tied to the UK’s obligations as the Norwegian scheme. The UK 
environmental authorities use additional policies in order to meet the UK objectives 
such as environmental tax on natural gas, coal and electricity, namely the Climate 
Change Levy and the Negotiated sectoral Climate Change Agreements (Smith and 
Swierzbinski, 2007). The Emissions Trading Scheme allows both allowance-based 
and credit-based emissions trading. The essence of the UK trading scheme is to 
reduce the environmental taxes and to provide incentives for the emitters to 
voluntarily take the cap (Ellerman, 2000). The Danish Electricity Sector Emissions 
Trading Scheme is in effect from 2001 and includes 1/3 of the Danish CO2 emissions 
and aims for a 10% reduction in CO2 emissions below 1988 levels. The mechanism is 
about electricity generation companies and the emissions permits are grandfathered. 
The penalty for non-compliers is up-to $22 per ton of carbon (Ellerman, 2000). 
In contrast to the aforementioned schemes the Swedish Flex-Mechs Emissions 
Trading Scheme has started as an open discussion. The mechanism has a very large 
coverage including almost all sectors and most of the GHGs. The idea of the scheme 
is to replace the CO2 tax and to substitute least-cost solution with best-available-
control technology. In addition, the system promotes JI and CDM (Ellerman, 2000). 
France was one of the major countries (along with Germany) which criticize the 
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emission trading schemes. However, a shift in French environmental policy resulted 
in the French Emissions Trading Scheme. The mechanism incorporates voluntary 
negotiated five-year agreements between the government and fossil-fuel intensive 
sectors which account for 80% of industrial CO2 emissions and other GHGs. The 
scheme also promotes JI and CDM. Just like in France, Germany shifted its 
environmental policy towards an emissions trading scheme. The German Emissions 
Trading Scheme has limited scope and concerns only large industrial firms. The 
Dutch Emissions Trading Scheme has also limited scope. It targets JI projects in 
Central and Eastern Europe. 
 
6.  Adaptation 
Adaptation to climate change may take place locally. Following Burton (1996) 
and IPCC (2001) a number of adaptation measures can be applied to cope with 
climate change risks such as bearing, sharing or preventing losses, modifying the 
threat, encouraging research for new methods and techniques and changing use, 
location and behavior through education and appropriate regulations. OECD (2009) 
provides examples of adaptation for various sectors. Specifically in agriculture we 
may prevent the loss by investing in new capital or removing market distortions and 
by changing use in crops and altering farming practices; in coastal zones we may 
prevent losses by upgrading drainage systems, increasing habitat protection and 
planning land use; in water we may prevent losses by increasing capacity, using water 
permits and pricing and by encouraging the change in behavior seeking for rational 
water use or by collecting rainwater.24 
                                                 
24 For detailed information see Agrawala et al. (2010).   
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In general all IAMs pay attention mainly to the relationship between damage 
caused by climate change and the cost of mitigation with adaptation to be either 
ignored or considered as part of the damage estimation (Fisher et al., 2007; 
Fankhauser et al., 1999). The first research modeling adaptation in an IAM’s set-up is 
by Hope et al. (1993) who using PAGE they consider two policies of adaptation: no 
adaptation and aggressive adaptation. They find that the latter should be used as it is 
more beneficial. 
Tol (2008) models adaptation in the FUND model. Relying on Fankhauser 
(1994) he uses coastal protection as a continuous decision variable and provides 
useful information on the dynamics of adaptation showing that adaptation is an 
important way to tackle the effects of sea level rise. What is important is the adverse 
relationship in the use of mitigation and adaptation as more mitigation may result to 
fewer resources left to invest in measures of adaptation. Tol claims that very high 
abatement levels will more likely lead to adverse influence as less adaptation will be 
used resulting to higher net climate change degradation. 
IPCC has included adaptation in every Assessment Report but took 10 years to 
organize a workshop on adaptation to climate change in Costa Rica in 1998 (Klein 
and Maciver, 1999) while it has been proved that adaptation is more difficult to be 
treated compared to mitigation. Kates (1997) refers to the IPCC 2nd volume of 1995 
Assessment Report dedicating a few pages to adaptation (around 4% of the pages of 
the full report). Kates ascribes this to the presence of two schools of thought: the 
“preventionists” and the “adaptationists”. The former consider adaptation as 
weakening societies’ willingness to control GHGs while the latter believe that little 
adaptation is needed as climate change takes place slowly for nature and the societies 
to amend easily (Stern et al., 2013). 
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Use of adaptation may lead to the so-called maladaptation (Mendelsohm, 
2000) with Barnett and O’Neil (2010) to put forward several types of maladaptation 
like reductions in incentives for adaptation and shift in costs to poor and coexisting 
emissions of GHGs. Moreover, maladaptation may increase costs with no associated 
benefits and may result to worse environmental conditions. Smit and Wandel (2006) 
classify four approaches adopted by researchers in their consideration of adaptation: 
composite indexes; scenarios and statistical and equilibrium modeling; cost-benefit 
and cost-effectiveness analyses; and “bottom-up” studies in cases of analysis.25 
Table 5 presents adaptation cost estimates provided by World Bank (2006), 
Stern (2007), Oxfam (2007), UNDP (2007), UNFCCC (2007) and World Bank 
(2009). The costs refer to necessary investment levels for adaptation to climate 
change in developing countries. Additionally, the UNFCCC (2007) reported a total 
cost for global adaptation by 2030 in the range of $49-171 billion yearly. Specifically, 
for the developed countries the range of the cost is between $22-105 while for the 
developing countries is within $27-66 billion per year. IIED (2009) claims that 
UNFCCC estimates is perhaps underestimated by a factor of between 2 and 3 for the 
sectors considered and could be much higher with more sectors included.  
 
Table 5:  Adaptation cost estimates in developing countries for the years 2010-2015   
                   (in billion US$/year) 
World Bank (2006) 9-41 
Stern (2007) 4-37 
Oxfam (2007) >50 
UNDP (2007) 86-109 
UNFCCC (2007) 27-66 
World Bank (2009) 75-100 
Source: Agrawala and Fankhauser (2008); IIED (2009); Chesney et al. (2013). 
 
 
 
                                                 
25 For more details see Stern et al. (2013). 
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7.  Conclusions and policy implications 
There are various policies to cope with the climate change problem. A number 
of measures may be adopted to tackle its effects. We may have increasing energy 
efficiency per unit of output using less energy-intensive methods and demanding 
products with lower energy intensity or to have reductions in production of high cost 
carbon intensive products together with increasing sequestration through reforestation 
and prevention of deforestation. We may store CO2 (or C) practicing sequestration 
like storing carbon in trees and plants as planting trees and managing effectively 
forests are important steps in coping with the problem. We may also use 
geoengineering increasing the Earth’s ability to reflect radiation. The latter may be 
achieved by using mirrors in space, by large balloons or by painting houses’ roofs 
white. Oceans may play a significant role in dissolving part of CO2 and other GHGs 
emissions. 
Reducing GHG emissions by controlling emissions from the burning of fossil 
fuels may be achieved by applying abatement methods (like scrubbers) to control 
GHG emissions or by reducing the carbon content of the fuels used or using instead of 
fossil fuels various alternatives energy sources like renewables. Investments in low 
carbon energy may rely on RES increasing their participation in the global electricity 
supply.  
To be more specific, planning efficient policies requires careful consideration 
of each sector. Specifically, in power generation we may have fuel switching to less 
carbon-intensive fuels (like natural gas for oil), and use of nuclear and renewable 
energy resources like wind, solar photovoltaic, biomass co-firing, geothermal power 
and small hydroelectric power. In both power generation and industry we may have 
energy efficiency and use of combined heat and power and carbon capture and 
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storage. In transport we may have policies to increase vehicles’ efficiencies, use of 
new technologies with more hybrid vehicles, careful fuel switching and more 
effective pricing mechanisms (taxation on gasoline, charging for using the roads, etc). 
In households we may have higher energy efficiency (associated with human 
behavioral changes) leading to substantial reductions in energy consumption and 
pollutants’ emissions.  The latter may be related to buildings insulation and use of 
combined heat and power. In general, agriculture and forestry have a great potential in 
reducing emissions with options related to forestry  and to the international 
framework of Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation 
(REDD). 
The latter may face institutional problems. Generally, the institutional 
framework is important in the imposition of appropriate policies to cope with or 
prevent the problem. Halkos and Tzeremes (2013) examined countries’ CO2 
emissions and governance relationship using six governance measures (voice and 
accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, 
regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption) as defined in World 
Governance Indicators from the World Bank. They find a highly nonlinear non-
monotonic relationship between CO2 emissions and governance measures and it 
seems that countries’ higher governance quality does not always result to lower CO2 
emissions. 
As control costs of abating GHGs are not certain and may differ among 
countries, economic analysis may identify the appropriate policy instruments for 
mitigation. Different policy instruments (like carbon taxes, control subsides, quotas in 
emissions, performance standards and permits) are required to cope with the problem 
either directly to emissions or indirectly to pollution related products (like subsidizing 
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a control method or taxing fuels). For some countries taxes may work better compared 
to permits. Domestically tradable permits may be used to satisfy national targets. The 
Kyoto Protocol includes international policy tools like the “assigned amounts” 
concerning national control targets. If a system of international tradable permits is 
adopted this may reduce costs by 50% (Olmstead and Stavins, 2007) whereas the 
inclusion of developing countries could lower by half again the costs (Edmonds et al., 
1994). As Olmstead and Stavins (2007) propose, for effectiveness, trading has to take 
place between firms and not countries with international carbon trading markets to be 
vulnerable to the problems faced by any other market and with serious obstacles 
imposed by high transaction costs or by the concentration of permits by some firms 
(countries). This makes initial allocation of permits quite important (Halkos, 1993).  
Obviously adaptation and mitigation have to be used together and efficiently. 
These arguments imply that different forms of mitigation are necessary together with 
ways to avoid free-riding. Additionally more investments in RandD are required 
together with developed countries financing mitigation efforts. Measures of 
adaptation have to be planned in such a way that they can be modified when new 
information is available. Markandya (2013) incorporates this with the use of option 
values in CBA or cost-effectiveness analysis. Markandya (2014) claims that 
delivering adaptive measures requires structural steps including all actions demanding 
sector-wide changes (physical regulations as well as economic or fiscal incentives). 
Both public and private sectors have to co-finance some activities and the 
international community to support the development of market and institutional 
mechanisms for an efficient level of adaptation.   
It is worth mentioning that societies have to understand the ethics of 
sustainability. To enhance greenhouse effect and the ethics of sustainability, Spash 
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(2002, p. 223) identifies four rules of ethics in the case of the existing greenhouse 
effect: the elitist, the egalitarian, the Paretian and the neoclassical utilitarian rules. The 
first demands that welfare of the best-off are to be improved. The second rule opposes 
this requiring that the welfare of the worst-off are to increase (max-min principle). 
The Paretian rule in the lines of the Pareto efficiency reallocates resources in such a 
way as to find the point where the improvement of a generation’s welfare cannot be 
better off without making someone worse-off. Finally the neoclassical utilitarian rule 
maximizes utility for all generations by reallocating resources. We may think of the 
elitist rule as our generation considered as elite and us living now.  
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